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FROM McNAGHTEN TO DURHAM, AND BEYOND A DISCUSSION OF INSANITY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAWt
By SIMON E. SOBELOFF*

It is an inveterate weakness of program chairmen as a
class, that when they invite a speaker they are reluctant to
indicate the subject they wish him to discuss. Their
habitual response to the invitee's inquiry is, "Oh, just talk
to us." Not so with your good Mr. Chandler. When he suggested a talk on "insanity and the criminal law," I seized
upon it with alacrity, not because I was so presumptuous
as to fancy myself an expert, but because it relieved me
of the responsibility of making the selection. I soon found,
however, that it was only a preliminary and temporary relief, for the subject is complicated and difficult, and its
literature is as voluminous as it is interesting.
Let me first of all state that I speak only for myself.
Proposals for improvement of criminal law and procedure
are under consideration in the Department of Justice, and
likely the matters which I shall touch upon today, informally and non-technically, will be given thorough consideration and the results embodied in a program for legist Because of the great interest aroused by the Durham case, which has
already been the subject of a note in the Rmrow, De Vito, In8anity As A
DefensC - McNaghten Rule Repudiated by the District of Columbia, 15
Md. L. Rev. 44 (1955), the RmviEw feels particularly privileged to be able
to present the views of the Solicitor General of the United States on the
subject, as embodied in an address delivered before the National Oonference of Bar Councils, in the Supreme Court Building, Washington, D.C.,
on May 19, 1955. This article also appears in Vol. 41, No. 9 (1955) of ABA
Journal and is used with its permission.
* Solicitor General of the United States; former Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland; LL.B., 1915, University of Maryland.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XV

lation which it is hoped will be presented by the Department next year.
As the assigned title indicates, we are concerned here
today only with the question of criminal responsibility.
We are not dealing with problems of mental capacity to
contract or generally to manage one's affairs, or with the
standards to be followed in civil commitment proceedings
although what will be said here necessarily has a bearing on these questions.
How far persons suffering from mental disease, mental
deficiency, or other forms of mental abnormality, should
be held legally responsible for breaches of the criminal law,
is something that has stirred vigorous debate for a long
time. As you know, in ancient times lunatics were not
regarded as suffering from disease but were believed to be
possessed of demons, the result of their evil passions. For
this wickedness they therefore deserved to be and were
beaten, kept in chains, and not uncommonly sentenced to
death by burning or hanging. If acquitted, they went free,
often a menace to their own and others' safety. An early
formulation of a rule to determine criminal responsibility
may be traced to England in the early part of the eighteenth
century when it was declared that an accused might escape punishment if he could not distinguish good and evil
- that is, to use the quaint language of Justice Tracy, if
he "does not know what he is doing, no more than ... a
wild beast."'
The extreme and picturesque requirement that to
qualify for immunity the accused shall know no more than
a wild beast was altered and moderated somewhat about
1760.2 The terms "right and wrong" were substituted for
"good and evil," and he no longer needed to be reduced to a
bestial level. The generally prevalent American rule stems
directly from the famous McNaghten case,3 in 1843, in
which fourteen out of fifteen English Justices agreed that:
"1... the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every
man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a suffi'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724).
'Ferrer's case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760).
a 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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cient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and
that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong."4
This test, known familiarly as the "right and wrong
test," turns on a specified and very limited symptom of
insanity, which science no longer deems necessarily or even
typically associated with most serious mental disorders.
Only the drooling idiot can be said to have no knowledge
of right and wrong, and he almost never gets into the
criminal court. Judging the issue of insanity according to
the right-wrong test exclusively is like saying as a matter
of law that the only acceptable symptom in defining appendicitis is a pain in the abdomen and that no other diagnostic symptom is valid.
In most jurisdictions this is still the law today. Courts
have adhered tenaciously to this rule despite a heavy and
persistent barrage of criticism for more than a hundred
years. Almost from the moment the McNaghten rule was
born, it was strongly attacked, not only by physicians, but
also by such eminent lawyers as Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, author of the classic "History of the Criminal
Law in England."5 A quarter of a century ago, Mr. Justice
Cardozo summed up the almost universal judgment.
"Everyone," he said, "concedes that the present definition
of insanity has little relation to the truths of mental life."
Mr. Justice Cardozo also said:
"If insanity is not to be a defense, let us say so
frankly and even brutally, but let us not mock ourselves with a definition that palters with reality. Such
a method is neither good morals nor good science nor
good law."7
'Ibid, 210, 722.
154 et seq.
612 STEPHEN (1883)
CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN Do FoR THE LAW (1930) 32.
'Ibid.
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A present member of the United States Supreme Court,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, recently stated in testifying before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment:
"... The M'Naghten Rules were rules which the
Judges, in response to questions by the House of Lords,
formulated in the light of the then existing phychological knowledge... I do not see why the rules of
law should be arrested at the state of psychological
knowledge of the time when they were formulated
...
If you find rules that are, broadly speaking, discredited by those who have to administer them, which
is, I think, the real situation, certainly with us they are honoured in the breach and not in the observance - then I think the law serves its best interests by trying to be more honest about it. . . I am
a great believer in being as candid as possible about
my institutions. They are in large measure abandoned
in practice, and therefore I think the M'Naghten Rules
are in large measure shams. That is a strong word,
but I think the M'Naghten Rules are very difficult for
conscientious people and not difficult enough for people
who say 'We'll just juggle them' . . . I dare to believe
that we ought not to rest content with the difficulty of
finding an improvement in the M'Naghten Rules. '
The Royal Commission reported in 1953 that the "right
and wrong" test has been objected to by experienced doctors
for over a hundred years as
".... based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does
not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual faculties, but affects the whole personality of
the patient, including both the will and the emotions.
An insane person may therefore often know the nature
and quality of his act and that it is wrong and forbidden by law, and yet commit it as a result of the
mental disease."9
Despite unyielding resistance to any restatement of the
rule, it was observed nearly sixty years ago, that judges
8Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953),
Cmd. No. 8932, 102.
Ibid, 80.
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of England "generally have not hesitated so to interpret
the law as to bring within its exonerating scope cases in
which its narrow, literal interpretation would have had a
different result."'10
In fact, Stephen" is among those who insisted that if
a person is prevented by mental disease from controlling
his conduct he cannot be said in any true sense to "know
the nature of his act," and that it is to be argued, therefore,
that such a person is not criminally responsible, even
under the McNaghten rule; but this strained interpretation of the rule has not appealed to the judiciary.
In a few American jurisdictions, there has been a minor
modification or supplementation of the rule, so as to exempt from criminal responsibility persons suffering from
irresistible or uncontrollable impulse. But the word "impulse" is unsatisfactory for it covers only a small and very
special group of the mentally ill. The word "impulse" is
suggestive of some sudden episode, and it is well known
that in many cases the sufferer acts not suddenly or impulsively, but cooly and with ingenious calculation. This
is characteristic of many who suffer from schizophrenia or
paranoid psychosis. Long and sustained brooding is characteristic of certain familiar forms of mental illness.
In 1869 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2 in the
Pike case, handed down an historic opinion sweeping aside
the McNaghten rule. It renounced McNaghten's insistence
on the right-wrong test. The New Hampshire Court did
not, however, adopt a new set of symptoms to ascertain
insanity, for to do so would, in its view, have been as arbitrary as the old rule. The court recognized simply that an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the result of mental disease or mental defect. Under
this decision, no longer is insanity defined as a matter of
law; instead it is made a question of fact to be determined
like any other fact. This determination rests upon testi10

Ibid, quoting an 1896 Report of a Committee of the Medico-Phychological Association.
STEPHEN, op. cit, supra n. 5. 167 et seq.
12State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869).
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mony of the psychiatric expert respecting the latest knowledge of human behavior and his interpretation of such
knowledge in terms of his observations of the accused.
More than thirty years before the New Hampshire Court
decided the Pike case, Dr. Ray, who was consulted by
Justice Doe, writer of the opinion in that case, attracted
widespread attention in both the medical and legal professions by his book which is remarkable indeed for the
clarity and modernity of the views therein expressed."
If any of you are interested in tracing the development
of thought on this entire subject, you will find that one of
the most rewarding pieces of legal literature is the opinion
of Judge Somerville in the Supreme Court of Alabama,
written in 1886.14 The merit of this opinion, which reviews not only the legal but the medical knowledge of the
day, is highlighted by a dissent which declares that, while
the majority opinion sounds interesting and persuasive,
the dissenter deems it his duty as a judge to take into account only legal authorities and that extra-legal writings
cannot be considered safe guides in judicial administration.
The intervening years have brought abundant confirmation of the idea that responsibility implies reasonable integration of the total personality which includes the emotions
as well as the intellect. Medical psychology teaches that
the mind cannot be split into watertight, unrelated, autonomously functioning compartments like knowing, willing
and feeling. These functions are intimately related and
interdependent. We know today that the external manifestations of mental disease follow no neat pattern permitting pat legal definitions suitable for universal application.
I also invite your attention to an interesting and instructive discussion by Chief Judge Biggs of the Third
Circuit in United States v. Baldi,1 5 who stated:
"8 RAY,

A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1st ed.

1838).
1

Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).

15192 F. 2d 540, dis. op. 549, 568 (3rd Cir. 1951).
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"The human mind . . . is an entity. It cannot be
broken into parts, one part sane, the other part insane.
The law, when it requires the psychiatrist to state
whether in his opinion the accused is capable of knowing right from wrong, compels the psychiatrist to test
guilt or innocence by a concept which has almost no
recognizable reality."
There is nothing more futile than the search for an
absolute test as a matter of law; for it is a scientific fact,
which has passed into common knowledge that no such
single test exists. We do not insist on a legal formula in
diagnosing other diseases; why in this instance? It is a
question of fact like any other, to be decided after hearing
the explanations of the experts. The weight to be assigned
to a single phenomenon is not to be determined by a rule
of law but in a factual judgment. If the issue in a case was
whether a bone was fractured, and surgeons were told they
could give their diagnosis and prognosis but must disregard
x-ray pictures as irrelevant, no one would think that desirable. If on an issue whether someone had typhoid the
pathologist were told that he must not consider the laboratory tests, but only one symptom, temperature, which is
solemnly declared legally conclusive, who would have confidence in such testing or such procedure? While the tests
psychiatrists use may lack the precision and finality often
associated with the x-ray and microscope, it is scarcely
arguable that the issues will be better decided if the most
advanced and enlightened thought is barred from the witness stand.
Justice Doe in the New Hampshire Pike case argued
that the McNaghten formula was false and should be rejected because it adopted as law a mistake of fact, and
that the mistakes of science are not science and they are
not law. As Justice Doe expressed it in a letter to his
friend, Dr. Ray, "The theory of the common law is that
it is unchangeable, that lawyers and judges may make mistakes, as well as men of science, but that the law, being
the perfection of reason, does not consist of such mistakes,
any more than astronomy consists of the idea that the earth
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is flat and that the sun passes over it."'16 This is an interesting and penetrating observation.
Again, he argues, "The mistake of our predecessors was
in taking judicial notice of contemporaneous medical opinion and adopting it as law."'17 He points out that the rejection of a proven mistake is not to make the law variable,
but is merely a refusal to continue according judicial
notice to a fact once it is shown not to be a fact at all. No
new proposition of law is involved.
There has been much spirited discussion throughout the
country since the recent decision of the Durham case,' in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, handed down a notable opinion by Judge Bazelon
in which he was joined by Judges Edgerton and Washington. The full nine-Judge bench declined to review this
decision which adopted in substance the eighty-five year
old New Hampshire rule, relieving the courts in this jurisdiction of the unbending McNaghten rule with its discredited right-wrong test.
The full merit of the New Hampshire decision and of the
more recent District of Columbia opinion in the Durham
case is precisely that they do not attempt to embody one
set of medical theories in place of another, for even if it
were possible to frame a test embodying more modern
knowledge there would still be the danger that in the
progress of science the new rule itself might be found inadequate. The whole point is not to restrict the test to
particular symptoms, but to permit as broad an inquiry as
may be found necessary according to the latest accepted
scientific criteria.
Professor Whitehorn of the Johns Hopkins Medical
School, in a memorandum prepared for a Commission on
Legal Psychiatry appointed in 1948 by the Governor of
Maryland, wrote:
16Letter of July 22, 1868, quoted in Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A
Pioneer Collaborationin the Jurisprudenceof Mental Disease. 63 Yale L. J.
183. 191 (1953).
17Ibid.

"Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954) ; see Note,
Insanity as a Defense - MeNaghten Rule Repudiated by the District of
Columbia, 15 Md. L. Rev. 44 (1955), noting the Durham case.
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"Psychiatrists are challenged to set forth a crystalclear statement of what constitutes insanity. It is impossible to express this adequately in words, alone,
since such diagnostic judgments involve clinical skill
and experience which cannot wholly be verbalized.
... The medical profession would be baffled if asked
to write into the legal code universally valid criteria
for the diagnosis of the many types of psychotic illness which may seriously disturb a person's responsibility, and even if this were attempted, the diagnostic
criteria would have to be rewritten from time to time,
with the progress of psychiatric knowledge."' 19
The Court in the Durham case directs trial judges within its jurisdiction to instruct juries that where there is
some evidence of mental disease or defect, in order to convict they must find two things: (1) that the accused was
not suffering from a mental defect or disease, and (2) that
even if he was, the criminal act was not the product of that
condition, for if the jury finds that the mental disease did
not cause the act, it should have no influence on the question of the defendant's guilt.
Critics of this view have not been entirely consistent.
On the one hand it has been claimed by some of them that
the McNaghten rule does not need to be changed, for, like
the judges mentioned in the Royal Commission's Report,2 °
juries have frequently exercised a so-called "moral judgment" to ameliorate the severity of the McNaghten rule.
Hence, it is argued that even if the rule seems in terms
to require the defendant to be held responsible, since he
knew the nature of his act and that it was wrong, if the
jury nevertheless recognized that a mental condition caused
his act, they would likely refuse to convict. But why, we
permit ourselves to ask, should we maintain a rule that
must be breached in order to make it work?
On the other hand, the Durham rule has been criticized
on the score of its vagueness, for it does not pronounce as
a matter of law precisely what symptoms are sufficient for
a finding of mental irresponsibility. This criticism seems
1 Quoted in GUTTMAOHEB &
419-420.
20Supra, n. 10

W~rHOMN, PSYCHIATRY AND THF, LAW

(1952)
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to me without merit. The facts as to mental condition will
be endless in their variety. It is for the psychiatrists, after
a study of the defendant, to inform the jury of their observations and interpret them in the light of their knowledge
and experience. The jury will consider the evidence of
the psychiatrists as they do expert testimony in any field.
No longer will they be restricted to the artificial and discredited right-wrong test. They will not be forced to ignore
the question of the extent to which the defendant's lack of
control over his emotions has deprived him of control over
his acts, or, if you please, has overcome his will, for that
is crucial in arriving at an intelligent verdict. This does
not mean that the law will no longer recognize that a man
has free will within normal limits of mental health. As
Judge Bazelon said in the Durham case:
"The jury's range of inquiry will not be limited to,
but may include, for example, whether an accused,
who suffered from a mental disease or defect did not
know the difference between right and wrong, acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible impulse, or had
been deprived of or lost the power of his will ....
"Juries will continue to make moral judgments,
still operating under the fundamental precept that 'Our
collective conscience does not allow punishment where
it cannot impose blame.' But in making such judgments, they will be guided by wider horizons of knowledge concerning mental life."'"
To put it in general terms, the jury will, as heretofore,
be called on to distinguish whether the act was done with
evil intent (mens rea) for which there is criminal responsibility, or was the product of a mental condition that makes
the act not one of free will, and hence not criminally
punishable. The right-wrong test is not completely abandoned; it is merely dethroned from its exclusive preeminence.
Judges and lawyers boast that there is no definition of
fraud; they think this is in aid of the law's effectiveness
21

Supra, n. 18.
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and does not weaken it. Its very vagueness is said to be a
source of strength, for it renders the law more adaptable to
unpredictable conditions. Or, to take another example:
Is the so-called definition of negligence really a definition?
What could be fuzzier than the instruction to the jury that
negligence is a failure to observe that care which would be
observed by a "reasonable man" - a chimerical creature
conjured up to give an aura of definiteness where definiteness is not possible. Have you ever tried to imagine what
goes on in the minds of jurors when they are handed such
a formula? No two of them would agree on what the
standard of due care is. Yet it is the best possible working
rule, and we do quite well with it in specific situations. We
recognize that the alternative of a fixed formula, however
ingenious, is bound to prove disappointing in practice.
Every man is likely to think of himself as the happy
exemplification of "the reasonable man"; and so the standard he adopts in order to fulfill the law's prescription will
resemble himself, or what he thinks he is, or what he
thinks he should be, even if he is not. All these shifts and
variations of his personal norm will find reflection in the
verdict. The whole business is necessarily equivocal. This
we recognize, but we are reconciled to the impossibility of
discovering any form of words that will ring with perfect
clarity and be automatically self-executing. Alas, there is
no magic push-button in this or in other branches of the
law.
To pursue the point further, consider such a term as
"due process." Is there a pat definition to tell us what is
"due" in due process? I had a wise teacher at law school
who concluded his lecture on undue influence in his course
in testamentary law by summarizing, "In short, undue influence is influence which under all the circumstances is
undue." Look at such words and phrases as "reasonable",
"practicable", "obscene", "unfair competition", or "cruel
and unusual punishment." Such standards, found in almost every branch of the law, are the bases for judgments
of law as well as fact. They are all as capable of expansion
and contraction as the subjective judgment of those who
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interpret them. They must derive their meaning largely
from the common sense of the people who apply these
terms.
The concept of causality expressed in the Durham
court's use of the word "product" has also been criticized
as leaving too much to the fact finders' discretion, but this
is no broader a discretion than courts habitually accord
juries when they charge them to determine proximate
cause in negligence cases.
What we ought to fear above all is not the absence of a
definition but being saddled with a false definition. We
must avoid the rigidity which precludes inquiry, which
shuts out light and insists on concepts that are at odds with
things known and acknowledged not only by the medical
profession but by all informed men.
The McNaghten rule requires medical witnesses to
testify in terms that to them were artificial and confining.
A doctor can offer expert judgment when he talks of illness, disease, symptoms, and the like. When he is forced to
adopt the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is speaking
in what to him is a foreign language and in an area in which
he claims no expertness. If the wrong questions are asked,
it should surprise no one if wrong answers are given. Is
it not preferable to permit the medical witnesses sufficient
latitude to describe the condition and express their findings
in terms they consider significant and meaningful?
This very day the American Law Institute is considering the proposed Model Penal Code, which submits several
alternative provisions concerning mental disease or defect
as excluding responsibility. Three different formulations
have been presented. The first declares that "a person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if . . . he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law."22
Another stresses lack of responsibility if his "capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
"AMimicAN

LAW INS rrUTp, MODEL PENAL COD

1955) Sec. 4.01.

(Tentative Draft No. 4,
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conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible."2 Note that the ultimate question to be determined
by the jury is whether the accused can justly be held responsible for his act.
The third formulation emphasizes capacity to appreciate punishment as a restraining influence.24
Even if there were time I should consider it unprofitable to burden you with the minutiae of the arguments pro
and con that have been advanced concerning these several
versions. The debate seems to reveal a greater degree of
accord than of actual disharmony. All seem to be agreed
that McNaghten is obsolete. All are agreed that there are
conditions, recognized as disease or defect, which in good
morals should excuse the afflicted one from criminal responsibility. All concur that not every mental abnormality
should be deemed sufficient to relieve of responsibility.
Imposture and evasion must be prevented in the interest of
society. All are likewise agreed that a person who has
committed a criminal act and is found not guilty by reason of insanity should be put in detention and remain there
as long as necessary to protect society. Where to draw the
line between what is and what is not sufficient evidence of
insanity is a matter of judgment in the particular case; it
cannot be described with precision in advance. Saying that
the disease must be "serious" as some insist, would not
achieve the hoped for certainty, for such terms are themselves inexact.
The same observation may be made in respect to the
suggestion that the defendant should be deemed responsible if he has the capacity to respond to a single influence,
namely, the threat of punishment. Psychiatrists of great
eminence have declared that this is too difficult to isolate
for psychiatric judgment. Moreover, this again singles out
one factor and exalts it to a special legal status, when the
problem needs to be considered as a whole in the light of
all the circumstances.
23

Ibid, Alternative formulations of Sec. 4.01.
Ibid.
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In the comments accompanying the American Law Institute draft of a penal code, it is recommended that the
concept of mental disease or defect should exclude "the
case of the so-called 'psychopathic personality'." This
proposed exclusion rests on the assertion that "psychopathy
'is a statistical abnormality; that is to say, the psychopath
differs from a normal person only quantitatively or in degree, not qualitatively; and the diagnosis of psychopathic
personality does not carry with it any explanation of the
causes of the abnormality'."25 To me, with all deference,
this is unconvincing. The New Hampshire or Durham approach seems preferable. It makes the causes of abnormality matters of fact for the juries to determine in each
case upon the basis of explanations furnished them by the
psychiatric expert witnesses. Dr. Overholser of St. Elizabeths has said that "psychopathic personality" is a wastebasket classification. The very term is used in the profession in different senses to describe different things. Therefore, it is unwise to provide a blanket exclusion or blanket
inclusion of that particular characterization. Indeed, in the
official nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association, the very term has been dropped as meaningless.
I note in passing that many pyromaniacs or kleptomaniacs would probably be held responsible under this
Institute proposal, since they are frequently termed "no
more than psychopathic personalities." Many psychiatric
authorities think these cases are obsessive-compulsive
neurotics. Those suffering from these diseases may well
not be psychotic; yet, by common agreement they often
lack that degree of integration which is necessary for legal
responsibility. I suspect that there will be a tendency here
first to make a judgment as to what is the wise and fair
disposition of the individual case and then to announce a
classification accordingly, and not the other way about.
Attempting to categorize cases as a matter of law according to these vague distinctions would only complicate the
difficulty. Not an unbending rule, but enlightened under" Ibid, Comments

on Sec. 4.01, p. 160.
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standing of the special facts of each case should be our aim,
especially where there is a broad twilight zone.
I confess to a feeling that the niceties of these several
verbalizations by the Institute or by Courts will escape
the jury. Any of these variations, if adopted, will probably
result in something not very different from what the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has declared
as the law, when it stated:
"It was the jury's function to determine from all the
evidence, including the expert testimony, not only
whether appellant suffered from an abnormal mental
condition, but also whether the nature and extent of
any condition... was such as to relieve him of criminal
responsibility under the standards then prevailing."2 6
But whichever formulation is accepted, it is an advance because it allows the jury to receive more light. The testimony presented to them will be cast in terms that are
meaningful to the witnesses and that can be more amply
explained.
Much of the reluctance to change the McNaghten rule
is doubtless occasioned by the fear that if the criteria for
determining insanity are broadened, instances may multiply of violators escaping punishment and being released
after a brief detention in a mental institution. The Court
in Durham was not unmindful of the apprehension. It
pointed out that an accused who is acquitted by reason of
insanity is presumed to be insane and may be committed
under the District of Columbia statute for an indefinite
period. The Court recommended that trial courts invoke
this commitment procedure "so that the accused may be
confined as long as 'the public safety and ...[his] welfare'
require".2 7 This is also the insistence of the American Law
Institute proposals.
Let us look at a typical case. An accused is found incompetent to stand trial; that is, he cannot fully understand
the charge against him and assist in his defense. He is
committed and after a period of confinement is certified
IStewart v. United States, 214 F. 2d 879, 882 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
2 Supra, n. 18, 876. fn. 57.
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competent to stand trial. If upon trial he is found not
guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense, he
is not necessarily entitled to release. The inquiry into
mental competency to stand trial and assist in one's defense is not the same as either the question of criminal responsibility or whether he may safely be permitted at large
after acquittal.
So experienced an authority as Dr. Manfred Guttmacher,
Chief Medical Officer of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore,
assures us that "the truth of the matter is that the finding
'not guilty by reason of insanity' has not resulted in the
premature release of offenders into the community. Dr.
William Alanson White made a study many years ago showing that, on the average, perpetrators of homicide committed to institutions for the insane spent more time in
confinement than those sentenced to penal institutions."
No restatement of the rule will revolutionize the practical operation of the criminal courts in dealing with mental
illness as a defense. The change which is under consideration will not spell ruin to law enforcement; neither will it
bring salvation. Juries will doubtless continue to bring to
bear their unscientific notions upon the scientific testimony
that has been adduced before them. This is not an unmixed
calamity, for juries often find ways, sometimes with the
benign acquiescence of judges to mitigate rigidities and
absurdities in the law; juries, who are not very different
from judges in this respect, will still tend to reflect the
community sense of justice which courts cannot wholly
ignore in maintaining public order. The restatement will
not of itself eliminate from the courtroom unseemly conflicts between experts. This is a separate problem, but these
conflicts will at least relate to things that are genuine and
not fictitious.
There is no reason to fear that the proposed change will
so relax the law as to weaken its sanctions or its deterrent
influence. After all, commitment to a hospital for the insane for an indefinite period is no more inviting a prospect
than a fixed term in jail. It is no soft and coddling disposition. Durham is a case in point. Having been declared
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mentally incompetent to stand trial and assist in his own
defense, he was committed to a mental hospital. There is
reason to believe that as a result of several years of treatment there he may be cured. If so, society's needs will
have been better met than by any prison sentence, long or
short.
Which offers greaterprotection to society - detention
and treatment in a hospital, and ultimately a medical judgment that the person is not likely to offend again; or a
penitentiary warden's certificate that the prisoner has
served his sentence and has been discharged regardless of
his medical condition? It must be remembered that prison
terms do expire and prisoners are released. Such release
gives no assurance whatever of safety to the community.
Statistics of recidivism may well temper our faith in the
prison system. Detention and treatment of sick people
rather than holding them to full accountability comports
with our traditional concept of the dignity of the individual.
It takes into due account the public safety and fully vindicates the proper interests of public justice. Let us give the
new rule a chance; and as we gain in wisdom from experience necessary refinements and revisions in practice
can be made.
I conclude by suggesting that there is need for continuing research to enlarge the resources of knowledge in the
problems of mental health and behavior, and for changes
in court procedures as well as in the substance of the law.
Means must be found to bring the legal and medical professions together on common ground. If psychiatry is to
provide maximum guidance and assistance to juries, psychiatric witnesses must learn to avoid technical jargon which
baffles laymen. We need better institutional facilities perhaps of a more specialized character - to deal with
the criminally insane and those who may be prevented by
timely help from becoming such. Members of this group of
lawyers who feel a concern for improvements in legal procedures and in public justice have important work in their
respective communities.

